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It is often argued that the true benefits of water resource development in international river 
basins are undermined by a lack of consideration of interdependence in water resource 
planning. Yet it has not been adequately recognized in the water resources planning literature 
that overestimation of interdependence may also contribute to lack of progress in cooperation 
in many systems. This paper examines the nature and degree of economic interdependence in 
new and existing water storage projects in the Ganges River basin based on analysis conducted 
using the Ganges Economic Optimization Model. We find that constructing large dams on the 
upstream tributaries of the Ganges would have much more limited effects on controlling 
downstream floods than is thought and that the benefits of low-flow augmentation delivered by 
storage infrastructures are currently low. A better understanding of actual and prospective 
effects of interdependence not only changes the calculus of the benefits and costs of different 
scenarios of infrastructure development, but might also allow riparian countries to move closer 
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It is now widely accepted that water resource development in international river basins is a 
highly interdependent process (Biswas, 2004; Serageldin, 1995). For example, large 
infrastructure projects upstream in a river basin may have significant impacts on both the 
quantity and the quality of water reaching downstream riparian countries and thus may affect 
economic benefits derived from water resource development throughout the river basin. 
Similarly, large infrastructure projects downstream risk foreclosing future opportunities for 
development upstream (Salman, 2010). This interdependence may evolve in complex ways over 
time due to effects of climate change,  population increase, and economic growth, all of which 
may increase competition for water resources (Jeuland, 2010; Pahl-Wostl, 2007). Lack of 
attention to interdependence in water resource planning and development has resulted in 
project designs that deliver smaller net economic benefits to riparian countries than expected. 
Failure to account for interdependencies and externalities can create daunting challenges to 
cooperation regarding natural resources in many arenas, not only water in international river 
basins (Barrett, 1994; Ostrom et al., 1999). 
Although the economic issues associated with water resource development in international river 
basins are often misspecified due to underestimation of the complexities of interdependence, it 
may not be true that the impacts of such interdependencies will always be large. In fact, 
overestimation of the impacts of interdependence among riparian countries in international 
river basins may also be damaging, for several reasons. First, overestimating the effects of 
interdependence among countries sharing water resources can fuel unrealistic expectations 
regarding equitable distribution of the benefits from cooperation. In the Ganges basin, for 
instance, there is a widely held perception that India would benefit substantially, in terms of 
flood reduction, from the construction of large dams in the Himalayas in Nepal (Sadoff et al., 
2012; World Bank, 2012). These anticipated benefits, if overestimated, could in turn create 
unrealistic expectations regarding appropriate compensation or cost-sharing arrangements 
among riparian neighbors along the Ganges. 
Second, overestimation of interdependence may generate unfounded concerns among 
downstream riparians. For example, Bangladesh has generally been wary of upstream 
development because of potential impacts on the availability of water downstream. These 
impacts might prove to be smaller than expected if interdependence were not in fact as high as 
is often assumed.  
Third, overestimation of the effects of interdependence may adversely affect the timing and 
prioritization of water resource development projects across sectors. For example, 
misperception of potentially high levels of interdependency could lead to decisions to hold back 
development in certain sectors due to the perceived trade-offs. In this way, opportunities for 
benefiting from such developments may be lost or delayed.  
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Importantly, most prefatory analyses of new infrastructure in river basins continue to focus 
primarily on hydrological and geographical considerations and their physical effects, with 
insufficient economic valuation to assess their net effects on integrated water resource systems 
(Harou et al., 2009; Jeuland, 2010). Lacking accurate, reliable economic analysis, a riparian 
country may decide to play down or overstate its position in interdependent water resource 
development projects according to its own geographical position. It may also act strategically 
according to such projects’ perceived or actual impacts on current conditions, which are by 
definition poor, incomplete indicators of future project performance. Thus the results of an 
information deficit can lead to unrealistic perceptions of the extent of interdependence present 
in such projects, perceptions that may become significant, unnecessary obstacles to realizing 
opportunities for cooperation. In this context, early and accurate economic analysis of water 
resource development options may contribute to the establishment of a shared understanding 
of the degree of interdependence that will be involved, as well as a more realistic forecast of the 
net economic effects of cooperation.  
This paper examines the nature and degree of economic interdependence in water resource 
projects along the Ganges, using the Ganges Economic Optimization Model (GEOM). The 
objective of this nonlinear, constrained optimization model is to maximize the total annual 
system-wide economic benefits generated by releases of water from a set of assumed 
infrastructure facilities. Although there is a general sense that the development of multipurpose 
infrastructure in the Himalayan region would yield significant economic benefits to riparian 
countries throughout the basin, there is also some expectation that trade-offs among potential 
uses for stored water could be very large. There is also no common understanding among the 
riparians about the relative values of hydropower, flood control, and dry season flow 
augmentation in the various regions that comprise the basin. Thus the determination and 
equitable distribution of benefits from such projects is a matter of significant concern and 
contention among policy makers.  
The research summarized in this paper focused on three questions: (1) What are the relative 
magnitudes of the economic values of hydropower, flood control, and low-flow augmentation 
from water resource development in the Ganges? (2) Are there significant trade-offs among 
hydropower, flood control, and low-flow augmentation resulting from water resource 
development in the Ganges, in economic terms?  (3) How sensitive to varying assumptions of 
economic value are the relative sizes and trade-offs from hydropower, flood control, and low-
flow augmentation delivered by Ganges water resource development options?  
To address these questions, we conducted a careful review of existing information on the 
development of Ganges water resources, and developed the GEOM mathematical model to 
explore the impacts of potential new hydropower infrastructures. Using the GEOM, we find that 
the potential economic benefits of new hydropower generation from developing the full suite of 
new investments described could reach US$7-8 billion annually. This is significantly greater than 
the current hydropower benefits produced in the Ganges basin (about $2.5 billion). We also find 
that the economic trade-offs among hydropower, low-flow augmentation, and flood control 
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objectives are very modest. Moreover, our findings show that although flood damages in the 
Ganges basin are presently substantial, the construction of upstream multipurpose water 
storage would not have a large effect on peak flows in the Ganges (particularly in wet years); 
that is, the economic value of reduced flood losses associated with these infrastructure 
development scenarios would be small. As for the trade-off between the two main downstream 
uses – irrigation in the Ganges plain and low-flow augmentation passing through to Bangladesh 
– we show that the optimal allocation between these two uses is highly sensitive to their 
relative economic values:  if the economic value of low flows in Bangladesh is high, the GEOM 
allocates less water upstream for irrigation, and vice versa. 
Our findings have several significant implications for improving the prospects of cooperation 
among riparian countries in the Ganges basin. First, our finding that construction of large dams 
upstream in Nepal would have limited effects on flood control downstream may prompt 
renewed consideration of options to develop smaller dams that focus primarily on hydropower 
benefits instead of seeking complex deals on large and potentially controversial dams that had 
been expected to deliver significant flood or irrigation benefits.  Second, the fact that there is 
little trade-off between hydropower production and downstream water uses means that 
increases in irrigation in Nepal and India or low-flow augmentation in Bangladesh do not come 
at the expense of significant amounts of hydropower, i.e., hydropower production is relatively 
insensitive to changes in the economic value of water to downstream users.  In this sense, 
downstream riparian countries (India and Bangladesh) need not fear that the operating rules of 
new hydropower projects developed upstream in Nepal will adversely affect or even foreclose 
their own development options. Third, the riparians can utilize economic analysis to better 
understand the nature of inter-dependency in this system, and to develop a common and 
shared understanding of the net benefits from Ganges basin cooperation. 
The paper begins with a summary of  relevant background information on the Ganges, after 
which we present themathematical description of the GEOM. We then report detailed results 
and conclusions.  
 
Background  
Previous studies relevant to the economic analysis presented here can be broadly classified into 
two categories. The first pertains to optimization and game-theoretic analyses of various 
potential water resource development pathways in the Ganges basin and of the distribution of 
the benefits they deliver to the affected riparian countries (Bhaduri & Barbier, 2003; Rogers, 
1969, 1993). The second concerns the value of water in its various uses, as well as the value of 
hydropower.  Some studies in the latter group attempt to estimate the marginal productivity of 
water in crop production in the expansive irrigation schemes located in the Ganges plain (e.g., 
Molden et al., 2001). Surprisingly little economic valuation has been done of floods in India and 
Bangladesh (see Somanathan, this issue, for an exception), of ecosystem services in the Ganges–
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Brahmaputra–Meghna delta in Bangladesh, or of the marginal productivity of water for uses 
other than agriculture. 
The Ganges was one of the first river systems investigated using systems analysis and basin-wide 
assessments tools.  Rogers (1969) used a linear programming model to analyze the benefits to 
India and Bangladesh (at that time, East Pakistan) of water resources development in the lower 
Ganges and Brahmaputra rivers, in terms of flood control, power production, and irrigation. 
Though constrained by severe data limitations and the omission of upstream riparians such as 
Nepal or Bhutan, the analysis suggested the possibility of significant net benefits to both India 
and East Pakistan from infrastructure development, even though the gains to be had from joint 
operation and budgeting for new projects appeared limited. In subsequent work, Rogers (Rogers, 
1993) expanded the analysis into a three-person game that included Nepal and added the 
option (favored by India) of water transfer from the Brahmaputra to the Ganges. The new 
analysis showed that the collective gains from cooperation could reach 24%, and that four-fifths 
of these gains would result from coordination of infrastructure investments. An important 
finding was that most of the cooperative benefits would accrue downstream, to India and 
Bangladesh, as a result of those two countries’ joint projects. (The investments considered for 
Nepal, however, were rather limited from the outset.) 
The other game-theoretic analyses of the benefits of alternative development strategies in this 
region have come from a more recent series of analyses by Bhaduri and Barbier (2007; 2008a, b). 
These largely focus on long-standing conceptions regarding the value of water transfers from 
Nepal to downstream riparians during low-flow periods, or from the Brahmaputra to the Ganges 
(Crow et al., 1995; Iyer, 2003; Verghese, 1999). This collective work suggests, first, that India 
would be capable of consuming any additional water transferred from Nepal to the downstream 
system. Second, the authors argue that altruism, that is, concerns other than simple welfare 
maximization within India, is the primary explanation for why India has allowed flow-through of 
water to Bangladesh during the dry season in the form of the Ganges Water Sharing Agreement, 
without requiring compensation (Bennett et al., 1998).1 The implication is that further altruism 
would be required in order for Bangladesh to benefit from additional dry season flow 
augmentation (Bhaduri & Barbier, 2008b). Third, transfer of water from the Brahmaputra could 
deliver net benefits in Bangladesh if India is altruistic, because flood protection gains would 
outweigh decreases in water availability. But if India’s altruism were low or nonexistent, and 
India unilaterally diverted flow to the Ganges, welfare in Bangladesh would sharply decrease 
(Bhaduri & Barbier, 2007). Fourth, Bangladesh could attempt to purchase water directly from 
Nepal to augment its Ganges inflows, but India might still choose to consume that water if the 
marginal value of the water exceeded what Bangladesh was willing to pay. In the latter case, a 
                                                          
1 In their model, Bhaduri and Barbier use a formulation with interdependent utility functions to allow for 
altruism. Note that this formulation accommodates pure altruism, or caring about the welfare of the 
other for its own sake, as well as altruism for political, economic, and/or other perhaps self-interested 
reasons. 
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grand coalition of Nepal, India, and Bangladesh could make every riparian better off, but only if 
India and Bangladesh had altruistic concerns (Bhaduri & Barbier, 2008a). 
Also relevant to our analysis are several studies of the marginal value of water and hydropower 
in the Ganges basin and wider region. For example, Rogers et al. (1998) obtained values of 
US$0.02 in Haryana (some of which lies at the northwest end of the Ganges basin), and Dhawan 
(1988) estimates the net income from water to be US$0.03 in the basin itself. In the wider 
region, a range of estimates obtained from various studies that employed a variety of 
methodologies – marginal water productivity estimation, average net benefits associated with a 
unit of water, and stated willingness to pay – span from US$0.02 to $0.05, (Abbie et al., 1982; 
Chandrasekaran et al., 2009; Gasser, 1981; Molden et al., 2001). Higher estimates, reaching 
$0.12 per unit, were obtained for water delivered at the canal level (Molden et al. 2001). 
Several topics relating to water use in the region are noteworthy but only indirectly relevant to 
the analysis presented here. The economic literature contains estimates related to the value of 
water quality and flood protection in the Ganges basin. Markandya and Murty (2004) used 
contingent valuation and revealed preference data to show that the nonuse benefits of cleaning 
up the Ganges in India dominate use benefits. For present purposes these estimates of the value 
of improved water quality have only limited relevance, as GEOM does not model wastewater 
treatment and pollution control investments. In addition, shifting the flow of water seasonally 
would likely have very minor effects on water quality in the most polluted reaches in India 
(World Bank, 2012). We are aware of no work estimating the value of enhanced low flows for 
ecosystem service provision in Bangladesh. Similarly, a few studies consider the value of, or 
willingness to pay for, flood protection in the Ganges delta (Brouwer et al., 2009; Islam & 
Braden, 2006; Thompson & Sultana, 1996), but the GEOM indicates that the reduction of flood 
peaks in the Ganges would be very modest even with the largest-scale development of 
upstream storage in Nepal considered (World Bank, 2012).  
Energy values for non-peak power based on the long-run marginal cost of alternative power 
sources in the region (coal and natural gas) vary between US$0.05 and $0.08/kW-h (Banerjee, 
2006; Gautam & Karki, 2004; Limbu & Shrestha, 2004; Tongia & Banerjee, 1998). Our 
calculations of the benefits from hydropower production are informed by these estimates. 
 
Methods 
The Ganges Economic Optimization Model (GEOM) 
The objective of GEOM is to maximize the total annual economic benefits generated by the 
system through releases of water from a set of assumed infrastructure facilities. The total 
annual economic benefits are the sum of four components: (1) the economic value of 
hydropower production from new and existing dams; (2) the economic value of irrigation water 
for the cultivation of agricultural crops; (3) the economic value of reduced flood losses; and (4) 
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the economic value of incremental low flows to Bangladesh, above the minimum release at the 
Farakka Barrage in India as specified in the Farakka Treaty of 1996. 
This model is similar to the Nile Economic Optimization Model (NEOM) that was previously 
developed and used to explore different combinations of infrastructure developments in the 
Nile basin (Guariso & Whittington, 1987; Thomas & Revelle, 1966; Whittington et al., 2005). As 
with NEOM, users of GEOM can explore the consequences of building various new dam projects 
and test the sensitivity of results to hydrological flows (using low-flow, average, and high-flow 
years). Users can also impose minimum flow restrictions in critical stretches of the river to 
ensure environmental flows, or can require certain urban or agricultural demands to be 
prioritized (for example, flows to Calcutta or crops in Bangladesh). Finally, users can alter river 
channel capacities to reflect changes in river geomorphology or the effects of enhanced 
embankment protection (assuming there are no breaches).  
 
While GEOM focuses exclusively on these economic values, it is not intended to suggest that 
these are the only values to be considered in the development of multipurpose infrastructure in 
the basin.  The Ganges is a river of enormous cultural, religious, and social significance, and 
these values also must be a central consideration.  Ecosystem sustainability; economic loss due 
to resettlement; recreation and tourism; navigation; municipal and industrial water supplies; 
and equity concerns within and across borders should all be factors in development decisions.  
The economic dimensions we do include are just one important part of the decision calculus 
surrounding infrastructure development and water allocations in the basin.  
GEOM is formulated as an annual, nonlinear, constrained optimization problem with a monthly 
time step. It determines the annual pattern of water allocations that maximize the system-wide 
economic benefits from hydropower, agriculture, flood reduction, and downstream low flows. It 
calculates the economic benefits by type of water use and by country. Minimum flows in specific 
upstream reaches of the river and at the Farakka Barrage are imposed in GEOM as constraints 
on river flow.  In the analyses presented here, for example, upstream minimum flows must be 
sufficient for all municipal demands to be satisfied, and downstream flows must be at least in 
accordance with the flow minima specified in the Farakka treaty between India and Bangladesh.  
The Ganges system is characterized in GEOM as a network of nodes and links (Figure 1). There 
are five basic types of nodes: reservoirs, irrigation withdrawals, flood outflows, flood returns, 
and intermediate nodes. The model includes 29 existing storage reservoirs (all but one of which 
are in India), plus 23 potential new dams.  All of these hypothetical new dams and the reservoirs 
behind them are in Nepal, with the exception of the proposed Pancheshwar Dam site on the 
Mahakali River, which is a border river shared by India and Nepal.2 Most of these reservoir 
nodes allow storage of inflows up to reservoir capacity, beyond which flows spill downstream. 
                                                          
2 The Mahakali River runs north to south, with the right (western) bank in Indian territory and the left 
(eastern) bank in Nepal.  The border runs down the center of the river, such that approximately half of the 
main dam and reservoir would lie in each country.  
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However, three of the new dams are run-of-the-river hydropower projects without water 
storage. Reservoir releases determine hydropower production and the amount of water 
available for downstream uses, and influence the peak flows in their tributaries and in the main 
stem of the Ganges. 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
There are 34 irrigation nodes in GEOM, some of which in reality correspond to very large 
command areas served by irrigation canals. Some of these command areas currently are only 
partially irrigated with surface water due to constraints on water delivery. In GEOM at these 
nodes water is removed from the river system and partitioned into four components. The first 
portion of this water is used to satisfy irrigation water demands for crops grown in the 
command areas (this amount of water is estimated based on crop-water requirements for 
different areas obtained from the FAO CROPWAT model). The second component is for losses to 
nonproductive evapotranspiration from canals and fields; our analysis assumes this portion to 
be equal to 60% of the water actually used by crops (the first component), or 30% of the water 
diverted to irrigation areas. The third portion of diversions – 20% overall, or 40% of the crop-
water requirement – is assumed to flow back into the Ganges system via return flows. Finally, 
GEOM allows additional diversion of water into groundwater recharge when the canal capacity 
is not fully utilized. This recharge water is not lost to the system; GEOM adds it to storage in 
groundwater reservoirs beneath each irrigation node. This stored groundwater can then be 
pumped (at a cost) and used throughout the year to help meet irrigation water demands when 
surface flows are insufficient. The water balance for groundwater reservoirs only incorporates 
flows out of the GEOM surface water system and does not include “green water” recharge, that 
is, recharge from local precipitation and infiltration. 
GEOM also includes eight flood outflow nodes. Seven are located on the northern Ganges 
tributaries (Yamuna, Upper Ganga, Ghagara, Rapti, Gandak, Bagmati, and Kosi), one is on the 
main Ganges. At these flood outflow nodes, monthly flows in excess of natural river channel 
capacities leave the river network and cause flood damages.  A fraction of these river spills are 
then assumed to return to the river at flood return nodes, which are located just downstream of 
the flood outflow nodes.  The other intermediate nodes in GEOM account for inflow (that is, 
where runoff enters the system), confluence (where multiple rivers meet), and distribution 
(where a river splits). In total, 77 of the model nodes receive inflows from local catchments. 
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Figure 2 illustrates the water balance to irrigation nodes, including nonproductive evaporation 
losses, seepage to local groundwater, delivery of surface water to irrigated fields, and return 
flows to the river system. The various flow variables Q are all decision variables in the model. 





Z  = total economic benefits (in millions of US$); 
ph  = economic value of hydropower (US$/kW-h);   
  = Annual hydropower generated in project at node k (in GW-h/yr);  
pirr  = economic value of irrigation water (US$/m3);  
  = volume of irrigation water delivered to area j, in state/country m (in millions of m3); 
pl  = economic value of low flows (US$/m3);  
  = volume of low flows to Bangladesh during the lean season (January–May),  
      above the Farakka Treaty minimum (in millions of m3);  
  = economic cost of exceeding channel capacity at node k, in state/country m 
     (in millions   of US$); 
cg  = cost of pumping recharged groundwater (US$/m3); and 
  = volume of recharged groundwater pumped to area j, in state/country m  
     (in millions of m3). 
 
The model uses a monthly time step t and determines the value of the decision variables that 
yield the highest outcome of the objective function Z. This model-determined pattern of water 
releases and allocations to water users is subject to constraints on flow continuity in the river, 
water balance and partitioning at irrigation nodes, river channel capacity, low-flow and 
municipal/ industrial water requirements, groundwater and surface water storage capacity, 
installed hydropower capacity, irrigation water requirements, and land availability. There is also 
a requirement that all “reservoirs” (including those for groundwater) end the year at the same 
level as where they began, though the optimal initial levels are determined by the model. A 
detailed presentation of the mathematical form of these constraints is included in Appendix A.  
GEOM also incorporates several other important features. First, technological and demand 
management interventions (lining of canals, investments in drip irrigation, incentives for 
enhanced recharge, etc.) can be assessed by altering the irrigation and municipal water delivery 
parameters that influence efficiency:  ρj, rj, and λk, which specify how releases to water delivery 
canals are partitioned between productive ET, non-productive ET, and return flows. Similarly, 
the effects of changes in cropping and intensity can be simulated by altering assumptions about 
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crop-water requirements in different areas using the CROPWAT and CLIMWAT tools applied to 
new cropping patterns, or other procedures for estimating water demands (FAO, 1998). 
 
Second, the economic value associated with irrigation using Ganges water is obtained by 
multiplying the quantity of irrigation water by the marginal product of water pirr. We adopt this 
formulation recognizing that  the current marginal productivity of water in the Gangetic plain is 
low (Abbie et al., 1982; Dhawan, 1988; Gasser, 1981; Molden et al., 2001; Rogers et al., 1998). 
Pumping costs from use of groundwater (parameter , which can be varied based on the depth 
to groundwater in area j) are subtracted from these benefits as well; thus the model only uses 
groundwater if the value of water outweighs these extra pumping costs. By systematically 
varying the marginal product of water in sensitivity analysis (that is, giving more or less value to 
the agricultural component of the model), we can see whether water allocations are sensitive to 
assumptions about the value of water.  
 
Third, GEOM seeks to minimize flood damages. Unfortunately, the damages μk associated with 
overbank spills at different locations are unknown at this time. Thus, much as with, agriculture, 
where we varied the weighting parameter pirr  in the objective function, here we study the effect 
of this value of μk on the optimal water allocations determined by the model. This allows us to 
examine whether trade-offs exist between the flood control and hydropower or agriculture 
objectives.  
 
Finally, GEOM includes an additional parameter pl that allows us to explore the implications of 
different economic values of water during the low-flow period in Bangladesh for optimal water 
allocations. This parameter is used to value incremental flows above the Farakka Treaty 




GEOM was used to explore the potential impacts of four scenarios, each with different 
combinations of new infrastructure projects. The hydrological year used in the base case is the 
year 2000, for which the overall runoff into the Ganges was 502 BCM, compared to an average 
of 508 BCM over the ten-year period 1999–2008 (range 460–545 BCM). None of the major river 
tributaries had exceptional hydrology in 2000.  
The consequences of constructing different sets of upstream storage infrastructures are 
measured relative to a baseline “state of the world” that closely resembles current conditions. It 
is not possible to characterize precisely the present situation of Ganges water management, 
because the amount and pattern of surface water withdrawals for different basin irrigation 
schemes in India are unknown. Instead, we estimate overall crop-water requirements in 
different irrigation schemes from state-level data for the major crops in the existing mix, 
accounting for local climatic conditions and the differing cropping intensities in irrigated areas 
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within Bangladesh, India, and Nepal.3 Thus instead of constraining irrigation water withdrawals 
according to existing surface water demands in the basin, the model solves for the theoretical 
area of land that should be irrigable given existing cropping patterns, yields, market prices, and 
water use at the field-level according to the irrigation water partitioning parameters.  
The four illustrative scenarios examined are as follows: 
1. Existing storage and flow regulation projects (status quo, baseline case) 
2. The three proposed Himalayan mega-dams: Pancheshwar Dam on the Mahakali/Sarda 
River bordering India and Nepal, Chisapani Dam on the Karnali River in Nepal, and the 
Kosi High Dam on the Kosi River in Nepal 
3. Only building smaller dams and run-of-the-river projects in the Himalaya in Nepal, of 
which we include 20 (only the largest among a long list of possible projects) 
4. All major proposed dams included in 2 and 3 above.  
 
Sensitivity analysis was conducted to explore the effects of several modeling assumptions on the 
results`: (1) varying the relative economic value of low flows to Bangladesh; (2) varying the 
economic value of irrigation water; and (3) testing the effects of low-, average, and high-flow 
years on both physical and economic outcomes in different portions of the basin. To assess the 
effects of differing assumptions in terms of the first two points, we constructed nine cases 
representing all low, medium, and high combinations of the economic value of water to 
irrigation and downstream low-flow augmentation (Table 1).  
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
The basic parameter assumptions used in our analysis are presented in Table 2. A discussion of 
the sources of data used to parameterize the model is presented in Appendix B. 
 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Results 
The economic benefits of hydropower from the 23 new dam projects considered in this study 
are estimated to range from US$3-8 billion per year, depending on the infrastructure scenario 
(Table 3). The upper end of this range includes the full suite of hydropower investments, which 
produce $7 billion to $8 billion annually above the current hydropower benefits produced in the 
basin (about $2.5 billion). These values are gross (they do not include the $1-2 billion/yr 
annualized costs shown in Table 3) and correspond to the assumption that 25% of power 
produced could be sold as peaking power in India to yield an average power value of $0.1/kW-h. 
If the energy from these dams were not used for peaking purposes, anticipated benefits would 
                                                          
3 Japan International Cooperation Agency 1985; Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS) 2004; Indiastat 
2005. 
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be reduced by about 25%. On the other hand, if the dams could be operated to supply greater 
than 25% peaking power, the benefits would be proportionally higher.   
 [TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
The magnitude of irrigation and low-flow augmentation benefits downstream of the 
infrastructure projects are more difficult to assess because they depend directly on the assumed 
valuation parameters. In the medium value case (marginal productivity of water equal to 
US$0.05/m3), these reach $2.8 billion; but they range from $0.3 billion (lowest value case) to 
$5.5 billion (highest value). On the one hand, the estimates of the marginal value of increased 
surface water irrigation presented in the baseline medium case ($0.05) would appear to be 
much higher than the current very low value derived from irrigation water in India and Nepal.  
On the other hand, in the future agricultural modernization and increased returns to water 
could change this picture dramatically. 
Also, although flood losses in the Ganges basin are significant, our findings suggest that the 
construction of upstream multipurpose water storage would have a limited effect on peak flows 
in the Ganges (particularly in wet years); thus the economic value of reduced flood losses 
associated with these infrastructure development scenarios will be small (Table 4). On the 
tributaries, and particularly in the Gandak River, the reduction in peak flows is somewhat larger. 
Nonetheless, because of the extensive embankments now existing along the Gandak and other 
tributaries, flood losses are unlikely to be significantly reduced through the development of new, 
large-scale upstream infrastructure investments.  Improved flood management will require a 
sharpened focus on forecasting and warning systems, as well as localized hard and soft 
responses  (World Bank, 2012). 
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Analysis of trade-offs 
We find that for the most part, the economic trade-offs among hydropower, irrigation, and 
flood control objectives are small.  This is because there is little difference in the optimal water 
release pattern for hydropower production and downstream water supply needs; the storage in 
the upstream dams considered is relatively small compared to annual flows. Both these 
objectives are best served by storing peak flows to achieve steadier, increased dry-season 
releases, and flood control is limited regardless of how operating rules are designed, because 
water quickly fills even the largest dams that could be built in the system once the monsoon 
season begins. There is a trade-off in the quantity of water used for irrigation in the Ganges 
plain versus low-flow augmentation in delta [Sundarbans], but it is unclear whether this trade-
off is economically significant given the current low marginal benefit associated with surface 
water irrigation in the plains and the unknown economic value of low-flow augmentation in 
Bangladesh. 
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Not surprisingly, the optimal water allocations --and economic benefits of irrigation in the 
Ganges plain and of dry season flow augmentation in Bangladesh-- are sensitive to varying 
assumptions about their relative economic value (Table 5). Given the difficulty in predicting the 
economic value of incremental changes for these uses, the precise nature of these trade-offs is 
difficult to assess at this time.   
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
When low economic values are specified for both irrigation water and low flows (which is 
consistent with the limited economic information available on these use categories at this time), 
the economic benefits from the Himalayan dams are limited to hydropower and some modest 
expansion of surface water irrigation in Nepal and India. In this case, the downstream economic 
consequences of hydropower development for India and Bangladesh are very limited.  One 
implication of this low economic value case is that the benefit-sharing calculus between Nepal 
and India for hydropower development is in fact much simpler than previously assumed. The 
economic benefits from Himalayan dams are almost solely due to hydropower generation (95%).  
If this is the case, India and Nepal should be able to negotiate fairly straightforward power 
development and trade agreements that also recognize any modest co-benefits in agriculture 
and flood management. 
When low economic value is assigned to irrigation water but high value to environmental flows, 
Bangladesh, India, and Nepal all gain from the construction of the Himalayan dams. Nepal and 
India primarily share the benefits of hydropower generation (assuming the excess power 
produced in Nepal is exported to India), and Bangladesh benefits from low-flow augmentation 
(increased environmental flows). Therefore, theoretically Bangladesh and India should be willing 
to share in the costs of building the Himalayan dams. Bangladesh could invest a modest amount 
to ensure valuable low-flow augmentation, and India could invest primarily as part of a power 
trade agreement. Alternatively India could pay Nepal more for hydropower received, and 
Bangladesh could compensate Nepal annually for what would effectively be a “payment for 
environmental services” agreement.  
When high economic value is assigned to irrigation water but low value to environmental flows, 
about 10-12 billion cubic meters (BCM) would be allocated for new irrigated schemes in Nepal. 
Given the poor availability of spatially specific data on agricultural productivity in the basin, 
GEOM assumes that the value of water in agriculture to India and Nepal is the same. If irrigation 
values are high and differentiated between countries, the economically optimal distribution of 
these flows to different schemes and riparian countries will change. 
Importantly, the scenario in which high values are assigned to both irrigation water and low-
flow augmentation reflects the current mindset of most stakeholders in the basin. It is widely 
assumed that irrigation water and low-flow augmentation are extremely valuable to both 
Bangladesh and India (Sadoff et al., 2012). Furthermore, many believe that flood control from 
upstream dams in the Himalaya would be extremely valuable for the whole system (Salman and 
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Uprety 2002; Huda and Shamsul 2001; Onta 2001). Our background research on the economics 
of water use in the basin (reviewed above) suggests the opposite. In other words, water has 
very low productivity in the irrigation schemes in the Ganges plain, such that the benefits from 
additional supply to Indian agriculture would currently be quite small (though this could change 
over time).     
Our sensitivity analyses also provide new information on the trade-offs between managing 
water for hydropower, irrigation, flood control and downstream low-flow augmentation in the 
Ganges basin. There appears to be little trade-off between hydropower production on the one 
hand, and downstream irrigation and/or low-flow augmentation on the other: hydropower 
producers and all of the downstream users would like monsoon flows to be smoothed and to 
see dry season flows increase.  In fact, hydropower benefits decrease very little (by about 5%) 
even when the economic value of water in irrigation and in downstream Bangladesh is assumed 
to be $0.1/m3 (Figure 3). This is because flood waters are stored behind hydropower dams 
during the flood season, and released gradually over the course of the year, which enhances dry 
season flows and thus meets the objectives of both water uses. 
 [FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
That there is little trade-off between hydropower production and downstream water uses 
simply means that increases in irrigation in India or low-flow augmentation in Bangladesh do not 
come at the expense of significant amounts of hydropower.  Figure 4 illustrates the small trade-
off between hydropower production and water uses in irrigation and in Bangladesh for the nine 
combinations of downstream economic values, and across infrastructure combinations.  
[FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
There is clearly a trade-off, however, between the two downstream uses examined, irrigation 
water usage and low-flow augmentation in Bangladesh, because consumption of water in 
irrigation in India precludes low-flow augmentation downstream in Bangladesh (Figure 5). If the 
economic value of low flows in Bangladesh is high, GEOM allocates less water to irrigation, and 
vice versa. This is consistent with the results presented in Table 5, which shows that increasing 
infrastructure development can allow both surface water irrigation and low-flow augmentation 
to increase relative to the status quo. With full infrastructure development (all Nepal dams, 
existing & proposed), about 35 BCM/yr of additional dry season water would become available, 
and this amount could be shared among these two competing uses.  In reality, of course, actual 
usage will be determined not only by the relative economic values of water to different users, 
but also by political, cultural, and social considerations. 
[FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
GEOM was also used to test the sensitivity of the results to low- and high-flow years.  Running 
GEOM with the hydrology for wet and dry years revealed, as expected, that the incremental 
value of hydropower produced by our infrastructures increases with flows in the basin.  A 
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“typical” dry year in the Ganges basin corresponds to a reduction in hydropower generation 
from the three proposed mega dams in Nepal of about 16%, and a reduction of 11% for full 
infrastructure development. The reduction is lower if all dams are assumed to be built, because 
the new, smaller dams are spread over a larger spatial area, and the driest years in particular 
tributaries rarely coincide. On the other hand, the incremental value of dams to irrigation and 
low flows in Bangladesh increases somewhat (by about 2%) in a dry year, because extra storage 
provides higher incremental dry season flows when water stress increases. Overall incremental 
annual benefits thus decrease by 8% to 10% in a typical low-flow year. 
In a wet year, hydropower production does not change appreciably compared to an average 
year (increases by just over 1% with full development), because of the limited storage capacity 
in the Himalayan dams. The economic benefits of the dams for providing irrigation and low-flow 
augmentation in such years also decrease compared to an average year (by 8% and 17% for full 
and 3-dam development scenarios, respectively), because there is less demand for this 
additional water.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
It is often argued that the true benefits from water resource development in international river 
basins are undermined by a lack of consideration of interdependence in water resource planning. 
Yet it has not been adequately recognized in the water resources planning literature that 
overestimation of interdependence may also contribute to lack of progress in cooperation in 
many systems. Among riparians in the Ganges basin, a widely held belief that dams in Nepal 
would produce large downstream benefits for India creates expectations of commensurate 
compensation.  This study finds that constructing large dams on the upstream tributaries of the 
Ganges may in fact have much more limited effects on controlling downstream floods than is 
thought, and that the benefits of low-flow augmentation delivered by storage infrastructures is 
currently low (though modernization of irrigation systems in India and Nepal could alter this). A 
better understanding of actual and prospective effects of interdependence not only changes the 
calculus of the benefits and costs of different scenarios of infrastructure development, but 
might also allow riparian countries to move closer to benefit-sharing positions that are mutually 
acceptable.  
Overestimation of the effects of interdependence may also present obstacles for cooperation in 
international river basins more generally, because overestimation may needlessly aggravate 
concerns of downstream riparian countries regarding the effects of proposed large upstream 
infrastructures. In the Ganges basin, for example, Bangladesh has been wary of development 
initiatives taken by India and Nepal because of their potential impacts on the availability of 
water during the dry seasons.  
On the one hand, our study finds that there is little trade-off between hydropower production 
and downstream water uses, because increases in irrigation in India or low-flow augmentation 
 17 
in Bangladesh do not come at the expense of significant amounts of hydropower. This suggests 
that the level of interdependence among different water uses is not as high as is commonly 
assumed.  On the other hand, there is a clear trade-off between irrigation uses in Nepal and 
India and low flow reaching Bangladesh. A better understanding of the true effects of 
interdependence between these alternative uses, and of their relative values to participating 
riparians might help the participating countries to reach more mutually acceptable water-
sharing deals and might allay some of the concerns that arise from misperceptions of a high 
degree of interdependence.  
The marginal economic value of water in different uses plays a significant role in determining 
the nature and degree of interdependence in water resource development in international river 
basins. A potential obstacle for cooperation in international river basins therefore might be that 
interdependence is often conceptualized in hydrological and geographical terms. As a result, a 
riparian country may decide to either downplay or inflate the notion of the interdependence in 
water resource development projects depending on its own geographical location and position 
relative to large water resource development projects.   
Whatever their origin, misperceptions of the manner and degree of interdependence in 
transboundary water resources development projects may become serious obstacles to realizing 
opportunities for cooperation. Our results show that the economic value of different water uses 
plays an instrumental role not only in shaping the nature of interdependence but also in 
determining optimal allocations of water resources.   
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1. Assumptions of irrigation and low-flow values in GEOM 
Economic value Low Medium High 
Value of low flows to Bangladesh above 
the Farakka minimum for Jan-May 
(US$/m3) 
US$0.00/m3 US$0.05/m3 US$0.10/m3 




Table  2. Base case parameter assumptions and/or sources for the infrastructure development 
scenarios 
Parameter description Symbol Units 
Status quo scenario 
(current conditions) 
Hydropower    
Value of hydropower ph US$/kW-h 0.1 
Installed power generation capacity of reservoir  𝐻﷩𝑘﷩𝑐𝑎𝑝﷩ MW 
Data from  
various sources  
(see data source 
documentation  
for details) 
Minimum operating head in hydropower reservoirs  𝜖﷩𝑘, 𝑡﷩𝑚𝑖𝑛﷩ m 
Tailwater level for reservoirs twk m 
Storage-to-head conversion factor for reservoirs θk m/mcm 
Storage capacity of reservoirs 





Agriculture    
Return flow from node k  λk None 0.2 
Marginal product of water in irrigation  pirr US$/m3 0.01 
Total irrigable land in area j landj ‘000 hA 
Existing data  
(see documentation  
for details) 
Crop-water requirements CWRj,t mcm/1000 hA CROPWAT values 
Cost of pumping groundwater  𝑐﷩𝑗﷩𝑔﷩ US$/m3 0.02 
Floods    
Channel capacities for flood nodes  𝑄﷩𝑘﷩𝑚𝑎𝑥﷩ mcm/month See notes  
Cost of excess flow at node k μk US$/mcm 500 
Return fraction of flood spills z None 0.2 
Low flows    
Value of lean season flows in excess of Farakka treaty 
minimum to Bangladesh 
pl US$/m3 0 
Other    
Municipal and industrial demand WSk,t mcm/month Existing data 
Minimum flow to Calcutta  𝑄﷩𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑎, 𝑡﷩𝑚𝑖𝑛﷩ mcm/month 
1285 (Feb-May) 
2935 (otherwise) 






Table 3. Range of GEOM outcomes for the infrastructure scenarios  







1. Additional hydropower   
 a. Production (TW-h/yr) 













2. Low-flow augmentation in irrigation 
  
 a. Volume of water (BCM/yr) 
 b. Incremental value above status quo













3. Low-flow augmentation in Bangladesh 
 a. Volume of water (BCM/yr) 
 b. Incremental value above status quo













4. Reduction in monsoon season flows (%) 
 a. Ganges at Farakka 
 b. Kosi at Chatra 
 c. Ghagara d/s Rapti inflow 





















5. Infrastructure costs   
 a. Capital cost (billions of $US) 











Note: Assumes that the marginal value of additional water in irrigation and that the marginal value of additional low 
flows in Bangladesh are both US$0.05/m3.  Annualized capital costs are calculated by assuming a 5% discount rate and 





Table 4. Percent reductions in peak flow in the Ganges main stem and major tributaries resulting  
  from the infrastructure scenarios 
  Infrastructure scenario  
Hydrology River +3 dams + Small Dams + All dams 
Dry year Kosi 
Ghagara 
Gandak 













Average year Kosi 
Ghagara 
Gandak 













Wet year Kosi 
Ghagara 
Gandak 
















Table 5. Nine cases of rrrigation and low-flow outcomes for different water values 
   with full infrastructure development 
Value of irrigation water 
($/m3) 
Outcome Value of low-flow augmentation ($/m3) 
0.01 0.05 0.10 
0.01 Additional surface water irrigation (BCM/yr) 







0.05 Additional surface water irrigation (BCM/yr) 







0.10 Additional surface water irrigation (BCM/yr) 





















[Qin – Q’ - Q’’]
Downstream
Channel Capacity ≥ Q’ + Q’’
Q’’’
Return flow
0.5*(Q’ + Q’’’) consumed by crops
Key Assumptions: 1) Return flows (20% overall)
2) Crop-water requirement (50%)
3) Losses to non-productive evaporation (30%)












Value of new irrigation is low ($0.01/m3)








Value of new irrigation is low (0.01/m3)








Value of new irrigation is low ($0.1/m3)








Value of new irrigation is high ($0.1/m3)





Economic benefits above the status quo by type, for four different low-low, low-high, high-low, and high-
high combinations of economic values of additional irrigation in Nepal/India and low flows in Bangladesh 
 
Figure 3. Economic Benefits for Four Scenarios of Irrigation and Low-flow Values 
 29 
 






























































































































Trade-offs between Hydropower Production and Irrigation Water Usage (Panel A), Low-flow 
















































Appendix A. Ganges Economic Optimization Model (GEOM): Detailed Formulation 
 
The mathematical model is expressed as:  
 (1) 
subject to the following constraints: 
River flow continuity constraints 
 
a. Regular intermediate nodes:  
    (2) 
Storage reservoirs:  
   (3) 
b. Intermediate nodes with flood constraint 
    (4) 
c. Intermediate nodes downstream of flood nodes: 
   (5) 
d. Farakka: 
      (6) 
 
Irrigation node water balance 
 
a. Channel capacity constraint: 
        (7) 
b. Partition of surface flow to field and groundwater (net of canal   
 evaporation ρj and canal return flows rj): 
     (8) 
Groundwater storage assumptions 
a. Groundwater storage balance  at time t: 
       (9) 
b. Groundwater end storage requirement: 
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        (10) 
Irrigation water usage 
a. Flow to surface water schemes, including recharge and non-productive  
 evaporation, and net of return flows:  
       (11) 
b. Crop-water requirement for irrigation schemes: 
       (12) 
  
Annual amount of recharge pumped to node j from groundwater (in millions of m3) 
        (13) 
Land constraint 
          (14) 
 
Annual volume of irrigation water consumed at node j (in millions of m3) 
        (15) 
 
Hydropower generation  
a. Annual power generation in project at node k, in state/country m  
 = annual hydropower generated in project at node k (in GW-h/yr) 
 =  and       (16) 
b. Net head in hydropower reservoir at node k in month t (in meters)  
 =      (17) 
c. Installed hydropower capacity constraint 
        (18) 
 
Reservoir storage constraints 
a. Live storage capacity: 
        (19) 
b. End storage constraint: 
        (20) 
 
Flood damage penalty 
Total annual penalty (cost)  of exceeding channel capacities at node k,    
in state/country m (US$) 








          (23) 
b. For Bangladesh: 
        (24) 
c. Supplemental lean season flows to Bangladesh above Farakka minimum   
 (in millions of m3): 
       (25) 
 
Satisfy all municipal and industrial water demands 
       (26) 
 
Non-negativity constraints 
   (27) 
 
where the decision variables are: 
 = local runoff into node k in month t (mcm); 
  = flow from all connected upstream nodes k-1 to node k (mcm);  
  = flow to all downstream node(s) k+1 from node k (mcm);  
  = flow to irrigation area j from node k in month t (mcm);  
 = volume of surface water satisfying crop-water requirements in area j at time t 
(mcm); 
 = water pumped from groundwater onto fields in irrigation area j at time t; 
 = volume of recharge into groundwater below irrigation scheme j in month t 
(mcm); 
Rk,t  = release from hydropower project k in month t (mcm);  
  = municipal and industrial water demand from node k in month t (mcm); 
 = storage in groundwater at irrigation scheme j at the beginning of month t 
(mcm); 
Sk,t  = storage in reservoir k at time t (mcm);  
Aj  = land irrigated in area j (in 1000 hA); 
floodk,t  = flood spill at node k (mcm); 
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and the model parameters are: 
ph  = value of hydropower (US$/kW-h);  
pirr  = economic value of irrigation water (US$/m3);  
pl  = economic value of low flows (US$/m3);  
 = cost of pumping recharged groundwater in area j (US$/m3);  
  = minimum flow towards Calcutta in month t (mcm); 
  = minimum flow towards Bangladesh in month t (mcm); 
 = irrigation canal capacity for area j; 
  = maximum channel capacity at node k (mcm); 
  = minimum flow required at node k (mcm); 
Δ = initial groundwater storage at irrigation schemes; 
 = storage capacity of reservoir at node k (mcm); 
Sk,t=0  = initial storage in reservoir at node k (mcm); and 
Sk,t=12 = storage in reservoir at node k at the end of the year (mcm); 
z  = fraction of flood spills returning to the river at node k; 
ρj = adjustment for field irrigation efficiency at area j (assumed to be 2, or 50% 
irrigation delivery efficiency at all irrigation nodes); 
rj = irrigation return flow fraction from area j (assumed to be 20% from all areas); 
λk = return flow from municipal and industrial demand at node k (assumed to be 
20% from all nodes); 
CWRj,t  = crop-water requirement for mix in area j in month t (mcm/1000 hA);  
landj  = total irrigable land in area j (thousands of hA); 
  = minimum operating head in hydropower reservoir at node k (m); 
  = unit conversion constant =  (kg /s2-mcm) (assumes turbine efficiency 
is 0.9); 
θk  = storage-to-head conversion factor for reservoir k (m/mcm; assumed to be 
linear);  
dsk  = dead storage in reservoir k (mcm);  
twk  = tailwater level for reservoir k (m); 
 = installed power generation capacity of reservoir at node k (MW); 
μk  = cost of excess flow at node k (US$/mcm); and  
WSk,t  = municipal and industrial demand at node k in time t (mcm). 
 
The model uses a monthly time step t and determines the value of the decision variables Rk,t 
(release from reservoir k), Sk,t=0 (initial storage in reservoir k), Sk,t (storage in reservoir k),  
(storage in groundwater under irrigation area j),  (withdrawal for irrigation from node k), 
 (volume of groundwater pumped out for irrigation in area j), Aj  (land irrigated in area j), 
floodk,t (flood spill from node k), that yield the highest outcome of the objective function Z. The 
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constraints ensure conservation of water (continuity) at the different types of nodes, restrict 
storage and hydropower generation capacity in reservoirs according to dam design features, 
force withdrawals of irrigation water to be consistent with crop-water requirements and land 
constraints, and require satisfaction of low-flow and urban water supply requirements. Return 
flows from irrigation and municipal and industrial water supplies are assumed to be 20% (i.e.,  λk 
= 0.2 for all k); similarly the return flows from all irrigation schemes are assumed to be 0.2. 
There is also a requirement that reservoirs (including those for groundwater) end the year at the 
same level as where they began, though the optimal initial level for each surface water reservoir 
is determined by the model (intial groundwater storage levels are fixed). The model can be 
solved on a personal computer with the General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS), using the 




Appendix B. Ganges Economic Optimization Model (GEOM):  Details of Data Sources 
A. Inflow data 
As stated in the Methods section, GEOM includes 77 nodes that receive inflows from local 
catchments. The flows were simulated using a NAM rainfall-runoff model developed at the 
Institute of Water Modeling (IWM) in Bangladesh. The model uses a Digital Elevation Model 
(DEM) that was developed from land-level data from SRTM90 from the Consultative Group for 
International Agriculture Research (CGIAR). The rainfall-runoff model was calibrated using a 
combination of sources: satellite precipitation data (TRMM; data are missing for 2003) and rain 
gauge data (Department of Hydrology and Meteorology, Kathmandu); Indian Meteorological 
Department (online); and daily hydrological flow data for tributaries in Nepal (Department of 
Hydrology and Meteorology, Kathmandu). Snowmelt in the Himalaya was simulated using the 
degree-day method. Hydrological flow data for the Indian tributaries and the Ganges in India are 
not publically available. The rainfall-runoff model could therefore not be fully calibrated for 
India. The data used are for the period 1998-2008.  
IWM already had detailed calibrated NAM rainfall-runoff models for Bangladesh (meteorological 
data from the Bangladesh Water Development Board), which were used without modification.  
Inflows from the IWM model were aggregated to a monthly time step and grouped according to 
GEOM’S inflow nodes. For the Brahmaputra and Meghna basins, over which the rainfall-runoff 
model has not been calibrated carefully, runoff based on historical inflows to the Padma and 
Lower Meghna (where these rivers join with the Ganges in Bangladesh) were used instead of 
simulated runoff. GEOM can be run using any of the available years of inflows, which are stored 
in the spreadsheetIWM_Inflows_Feb_2010.xls. 
B. Reservoir data 
Data on existing and potential dams and associated reservoirs have been collected from a 
variety of sources. Much of the data on existing dams in India comes from the National Register 
of Large Dams (Central Water Commission, 2009). These data have been supplemented with 
information from sources such as Hydrology and Water Resources of India (Jain et al., 2007) and 
various online sources including Departments of Irrigation for individual Indian states (listed 
below, at Agriculture) and, for the Hooghly–Damodar system, from the Damodar Valley 
Corporation website (http://www.dvcindia.org/index.htm); these cover existing and potential 
projects. The sources for different types of information have been identified more clearly in the 
spreadsheet Modeling_Database.xls. 
For Nepal, the data on potential projects are primarily from three sources: the National Water 
Plan for Nepal (Singh, 2003), the National Electricity Authority’s listing of potential large projects 
exceeding 100MW (Nepal Electricity Authority, 2008), and the Nepal Hydropower Database 
(Nepal Hydropower Association, 2009).  
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There are no feasible surface water storage projects in Bangladesh. 
C. Agricultural data 
1. Surface water irrigated command areas 
The quality of the data on surface water irrigation schemes is inconsistent, with the 
largest problems having to do with information on India. Due to the insufficiency of 
reliable water supply, there is a large gap between the official developed potential 
published by the Government of India and the actual area irrigated using surface water, 
which varies seasonally and annually. In GEOM we have tried to reflect the developed 
potential area using the land constraint and to allow the model to irrigate as much of 
the land as it can to grow a particular mix of crops (see below). 
 
For India, the developed potential by state was obtained from several sources: Indiastat 
data from the National Irrigation Census of the Ministry of Water Resources and work 
by Narayanmoorthy (2006). An attempt was then made to allocate this potential among 
the different irrigation schemes in the model, taking into account information obtained 
from the existing canal capacities (provided by IWM, spreadsheet 
IWM_Existing_Diversion_Capacity.xls; data from various sources) and cross-checked 
against online information from the following state Water Resources or Irrigation 
departments: 
 Jharkhand: http://www.jharkhand.gov.in/new_depts/water/water_fr.html  
 Madhya Pradesh: http://www.mp.gov.in/wrd/  
 Uttar Pradesh: http://irrigation.up.nic.in/diversion_projects.htm  
 West Bengal: 
http://www.wbgov.com/portal/banglarmukh/Government/Departments/Depar
tmentListPortletWindow?action=e&windowstate=normal&mode=view  
The following state agriculture department web sites did not provide reliable data: 
 Bihar: http://wrd.bih.nic.in/  
 Haryana: http://hid.gov.in/  
 Himalchal Pradesh: http://hpiph.org/  
 Rajasthan: http://waterresources.rajasthan.gov.in/2irrig.htm  
The India data is summarized in the spreadsheet Land Constraints Irrigation.xls. 
For Bangladesh, the relevant irrigation schemes are in the Ganges Dependent Area; data 
were obtained from the Institute for Water Modeling in Dhaka (see 
Irrigation_projects_OGDA.doc). 
For Nepal, the data on potential irrigated area come from a recent district survey of 
agriculture and irrigation potential (Center for Engineering Research and Development, 
2007). The data were roughly aggregated into basin-level irrigation potential, to 
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correspond with the schemes in the model. Tthese data and calculations are 
summarized in the spreadsheet Land Constraints Irrigation.xls.  
 
2. Crop mix 
For India, the crop mix data were obtained from Indiastat and are available by district. 
We used the state-level averages (see file India State District irrigated area by crop.xls). 
Data were not available for Jharkhand state; the years selected are 2005-6 for most 
states except Uttar Pradesh (2003-4). Only 3-5 major crops were put into the crop mix 
for each state. 
 
For Bangladesh, the data on irrigated crops by area are for 2002-3 and were obtained 
from the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics Agriculture Wing (see file BBS 1979_2003 
Irrigated crops area.xls). We also have data for other cropping years going back to 1979-
80. The crops are Aus, Aman, and Boro rice; wheat, potato, vegetable; and other, 
comprised of other cereals, pulses, oil seeds, sugarcane, cotton, and any other minor 
crops.  
 
For Nepal, data on the crop mix were taken from the Kosi Master Plan without 
modification. 
 
3. Cropping schedules 
Cropping schedules for India and Bangladesh were obtained from crop planting 
schedules monitored by the US Department of Agriculture for those countries. See 
http://www.fas.usda.gov/remote/aus_sas/crop_information/calendars/clndr_jan.htm#I
ndia.  These data have been downloaded to the file Cropping_schedules.doc. 
 
Cropping schedules for Nepal have been taken from the Kosi Master Plan without 
modification. 
 
4. Crop-water requirements  
Crop-water requirements were calculated using the FAO’s CROPWAT software. The FAO 
climate data were obtained from CLIMWAT for meteorological stations nearest the 
different irrigation schemes in the model. To be conservative, precipitation data for 
India were then adjusted to reflect the fourth driest of five years of available district-
level data (see India Rainfall_data_statedistrict.xls) monthly rainfall rather than average 
monthly rainfall. For Bangladesh, dependable rainfall was used from an annex to the 
IWM National Water Management Plan report (see NWMP_annexC_Irrigation.doc). 
Crop-water requirements were then calculated for each irrigation scheme using the 
state-level crop mix and schedules obtained above. 
 
D. Channel capacities 
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The channel capacities for seven Ganges tributaries and the main Ganges come from a series of 
studies on river geomorphology conducted in India. These results are summarized in Table A1. 
Table A1. Channel capacities presented in the literature (locations used in GEOM are bold) 




Yamuna U/s Agra Canal  8554 Jain and Sinha (2003b) 
Upper Ganga Hardwar 
Fategarh 




Jain and Sinha (2003b) 
Roy and Sinha (2007) 
Roy and Sinha (2007) 
Ghagara D/s Girija Barrage 18144 Jain and Sinha (2003b) 










Jain and Sinha (2003a) 
Kosi Baltara 14904 Sinha (1998) 
Main Ganges Farakka 82944 Jain and Sinha (2003b) 
 
E. Municipal and industrial demands 
The municipal and industrial demands for surface water included in the model are currently 
limited and should be verified (Table A2). There are many large cities along the Ganges, and they 
probably consume surface water supplies. 
Table A2. Municipal and industrial demands in GEOM 
Node  City Monthly demand (mcm) 
WS100_1  Kanpur 5 
WS101_1 Delhi 60 
WS101_2 Agra 5 
WS101_3 Dhaolpur 5 
WS103_1 Lucknow 0.5 
WS104_1 Adhaura 5 
 
